The role that domestic and international financial conditions have in shaping developing countries' governments' debt structure is structurally estimated using data on individual bond issuance. The structural model, which employs financial and demographic conditions to achieve identification, is used to estimate three key characteristics of sovereign bonds:
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Introduction
How could the International Financial Architecture be reformed, to reduce the frequency and extent of financial crises? Commentators have pointed out that many of the last crises episodes in developing countries (EMEs and LDCs); have occurred after periods of accumulation of large quantities of debt on short maturities. Is it that these economies have a preference for short term debt, or market conditions do not allow them to borrow otherwise?
Already in 1995, the World Bank recommended Asian countries to develop their domestic bond markets. The subsequent crises taught that developing economies actually needed deeper and more liquid bond markets. These would help to reduce both maturity and currency mismatches. Additionally, the estimation is used to derive a control function that permits correcting biases when estimating the structural model which could arise due to sample selection problems. Eichengreen et al. (2001) , and Min et al. (2004) show that non fundamental factors, "market sentiment" in their terminology, are very important determinants of when and how developing governments borrow. The current analysis, by accounting for financial conditions both at home and abroad, unmasks some factors behind that residual. The international financial situation is represented by including U.S. T-bill rates, an index that proxies global liquidity and a variable reflecting the growth rate of the previous index.
These last two variables, whose construction is explained in detail in section 3, can be seen as directly related with investors' risk attitude. 2 An increase in the level of international liquidity, by increasing the money available in the hands of investors, reduces their (relative) risk aversion. To understand the role of domestic financial conditions different variables, obtained mostly from the Financial Structure Database, were used. Main focus was domestic bonds and stocks markets. The first was represented by the size of the public debt bond market relative to GDP. This same variable was used in Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) . 3 It reflects the level of development of the domestic bond market for public debt. To represent stock markets two variables were included: the stock market capitalization over GDP, and the stock market turnover. The first measure gives an idea of the relative size of the stock market. The last variable represents the level of liquidity/activity on that market. To assess the robustness of the results, the analysis was also performed using two different data sets. One with data on financial conditions collected by La Porta et al. [LLSV (1999) ], and other with data obtained from the World Development Indicators (WDI).
Results show that when spreads rise, governments prefer to issue shorter maturities.
They also show that ampler global liquidity increases developing economies ability to tap the market and drives down the spreads. On the other hand, development of domestic financial markets appears to facilitate issuance in longer maturities and/or with lower spreads.
This is evidence of a beneficial interaction between domestic financial deepening and access conditions on international financial markets. Some preliminary evidence is provided about the role of issuance clustering. It is shown that issuance clustering has an undoubtedly beneficial effect on the average maturity of domestic debt.
The next section gives an overview of past findings, and summarizes the main contributions of the paper. Section 3 presents the econometric strategy, with a detailed explanation of the identification strategy. In section 4 the data used is briefly described. The main results and robustness checks are commented in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
Tables and data sources are presented in the Appendix. get an intuition about the big numbers of an economy. But, if the focus is on specific debt characteristics, it is necessary to use individual issues. However, this kind of data is scarce and incomplete. These may be the reasons why available analyses with micro data have pooled together public and private debt, in the form of both, bond or loans.
The broad picture that arises from these contributions is that sound economic aggregates, monetary stability, and the political and legal environment are the fundamental factors explaining the observed debt structure.
The Macro Oriented Empirical Literature
Interest rates in the U.S. are often seen as an important factor conditioning capital flows to developing economies. Antzulatos (2000) shows that the ongoing process of portfolio diversification has reduced their effect. The "original sin" is analyzed in great detail in Hausmann and Panizza (2003) . They find little evidence that factors like the level of development, institutional quality or monetary credibility are at the basis of it. The role of institutional factors, in determining the currency composition of the debt, is examined in Claessens et al. (2003) . They find evidence of scale effects, countries with a larger base of domestic investors issue longer debt denominated in domestic currency. Evidence relating fixed exchange rates with larger foreign denominated debt markets is presented. Lane (2005) finds a significant relation between openness and debt levels. In Mody and Taylor (2004) a model of market disequilibrium is estimated. This allows recovering a supply and a demand function for capital. 4 The results show that informational asymmetries are an important determinant of credit crunches. Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) shows that the slow development of bond markets in Asia is due to the combination of weak institutions, exchange rate volatility, and lack of competition in the banking industry. In line with this result, Boot and Thakov (1997) show that for a financial system to become mature the development of sources of credit different than bank lending is a must. were jointly analyzed, along with a probit to control for sample selection. In order to overcome the identification problem they assumed that, while the maturity affects the spread, the spread has no contemporaneous effect on the maturity. However, such strategy disregards cost considerations by the government when choosing the maturity. Their study made clear the importance of sound fundamentals, as they make the maturity of the debt longer, and relatively cheaper. However, it also showed that non fundamental factors, "market sentiment", 
This Paper
The main contribution regards the econometric strategy. The simultaneous equations system we handle is expressed as a supply and demand model, for which we can find exclusion restrictions based on previous theoretical and empirical contributions. Comfortingly, results
indicate that the identification mechanism works. The econometric analysis presented here, in addition to the sample selection concern, addresses two issues that were disregarded in previous studies. First, when estimating the maturity-spread relation, the issued amount variable is treated as an endogenous variable.
Previous work has assumed that the issued amount was unrelated with other bond characteristics. Such an assumption, if false, could give rise to endogeneity problems.
Second, a strategy to estimate the maturity-spread relation without relying on diagonalization is provided. The goal is to understand how spreads and maturity are jointly determined.
The problem can be stated in terms of supply and demand equations,
where it S and it M are the spread and maturity of a bond issued by country i at time t.
These are the potentially endogenous variables of the system.
it
X is a vector containing the exogenous variables. 7 The errors are assumed to be well behaved,
The supply equation explains the preferred maturity of the investors. The demand equation determines the preferred maturity for the government. This makes it easier to find a set of exclusion restrictions in S Θ and D Θ , needed to identify the structural parameters, and permits to relax the unpleasant assumption that spreads have no effect on observed
Simple manipulation of the system above leads to 
. This is the model to be estimated.
8
As mentioned before, along with the analysis of the characteristics of the bond, we study the issuance decision by means of a probit model. The dependent variable is access to financial markets in a given quarter. This quarterly indicator, it I , takes value one when country i tapped the market on period t . The model, once that the issuance analysis is included is
7. Enumeration of the explanatory variables included at each stage of the analysis is relegated to the next section. 8. The relation between the coefficients in equations (1) to (3), and those in equation (4) is,
This is useful not only because it allows us to make an assessment of the factors determining the ability of developing economies to tap the financial markets, but also because it is a way to create the control function (the mills ratio) required to fix sample selection biases.
As pointed out above, participation in the bond market has risen over time. This could imply that, OLS estimates of the relationship between specific country characteristics and spreads could be biased if these country characteristics not only affected the price of the debt, but also market access. 
Political Risk
Previous analyses have shown that political risk is an important determinant of both market access and borrowing strategies. Following Eichengreen and Mody (1999) and EHM (2001) an OLS estimation of the credit rating against a set of macroeconomic factors is performed, 10 By construction, a higher rating residual is associated with higher political risk. This residual will be used as an additional regressor in subsequent steps.
Issuance
Once that 
, is obtained. This ratio will be used as a regressor in subsequent estimations. It will help us controlling for the sample selection concerns expressed before. It should be noted that the mills ratio collects, not only the factors that affect the issue decision of credit rationed governments, but also voluntary decisions not to access the market.
11 As in EHM, to guarantee identification the probit model contains a variable only present at this stage of the estimation, the ratio of reserves to imports.
Size
As mentioned above, the issue size, it Q , can be simultaneously determined with the other terms of the contract. Endogeneity problems could arise from the direct introduction of the variable in the system. 12 To avoid this problem the extended system is made triangular, and the size of the issue is replaced by the estimated value obtained from an OLS regression using a set of variables that previous studies found significant, 9. This would be the case whenever
10. We used this indicator for consistency with EHM work. 11. A natural extension would be to use disequilibrium models (see Maddala and Nelson, 1974) to understand if the selection arises due to credit rationing or to a voluntary decision. 12. If the amount is endogenous, the system can be redefined as
The estimation strategy amounts to triangularise the system. In terms of the matrix A,
This implies that, once a country can issue, the decision of how much debt to issue is not guided by the spreads or by the maturity. This is a quite restrictive statement, which may fit best countries who do not suffer from credit rationing.
is the predicted size.
The ratio of short term debt to total debt and GDP were selected as exclusion restrictions in this step. The first gives an idea of the possible need of funds in the short run.
The fact that larger countries tend to have larger financial needs motivates the introduction of the second.
Structural Model
Finally, the analysis moves to jointly determining spread and maturity. On each period of time there are countries for which no debt was issued, while others tapped the market more than once. The estimation is done by considering each issue as an individual observation, and then taking care of time and spatial effects by including periods and region dummies.
In order to estimate the simultaneous equations system, a two steps procedure was chosen. 13 The way in which the procedure works is briefly summarized below. The first step amounts to estimate the reduced form parameters. We know that for the model (4) a reduced form always exists: 
This allows retrieving
where Π is the OLS estimates of Π. The next step is to replace the endogenous variables by their first step estimate,
Identification of the system requires defining two sets of instruments. The one used to identify the effect of the maturity on the spread equation requires variables which directly affect the preferred maturity of the government, but only affect the preferred maturity of the investors through the spread. Two candidates are presented, pension reforms and the demographic structure. During the last decade, some developing economies financed reforms in their pension systems by issuing sovereign bonds.
14 The maturity of these bonds could be affected by the interest of the governments to match durations. An indicator which takes value one on debt issued up to three years after the reform was constructed. Given the high cost of these reforms, it makes sense to assume that they were financed over a number of years after the 13. Also a three steps procedure was applied, yielding similar results. 14. We focus in reforms that implied a change from a pay as you go system to one with individual accounts. These changes let the governments with the need of financing the retirement benefits of existing pensioners, and the ones to come in the near future, during the transition process. In this section, the main results of the different parts of the analysis are reported step by step.
The main focus is on the effect of financial conditions, the identification strategy, and on results that contrast with previous findings. Tables containing the estimation results and the specification tests can be found in the Appendix.
Determinants of Credit Rating
In Our estimates show that previous debt rescheduling, higher total external debt over GDP and higher inflation have a negative impact on the rating. On the other hand higher reserves over GDP, exports over GDP or GDP growth are associated with improving ratings.
The Issuance Decision
The analysis of the probability of issuance is performed by adding to the benchmark EHM probit specification, first the variables reflecting international availability of funds, then the ones representing the domestic financial conditions, and finally all together. Additionally, most of the regressions include dummies to collect the possible effects that crises would have. They take a value one on the specific quarter in which commentators claim the crises to have started and on the following three quarters. The results are reported in tables A1
and A2 in the Appendix.
18. This is a comforting result because, while we used the S&P rating, EHM used data from Institutional Investors.
The first two columns in proxied by a larger GDP, lower political risk, and higher ratios of reserves to imports increase the probability of issuance. However, the sign of the last one changed when domestic financial variables were added to the regression. Previous debt rescheduling, higher external debt, and a lower debt service to exports ratio seem to reduce the probability of a country issuing debt. Increases in the growth of international liquidity, as expected, raise the probability of issuance. Regarding the crises dummies, although the significance was not always especially high, there are some indications, consistent with the contagion stories found elsewhere, that the Mexican and the Russian crises affected the probability of observing developing economies tapping the financial markets at a global level. It is interesting to note that the international liquidity appears to be a more important determinant of issuance than the 10 year U.S. T-bill. As long as those two variables can be seen as reflecting quantity and price of the international funds, this result points to the fact that the quantity of funds available is more important for issuance than their cost (credit rationing).
The next set of results, when domestic financial conditions are taken into account is collected in table A2. First column adds to the EHM benchmark the selected variables.
In the second column the international liquidity variables are added. 19 The last column collects the results of the estimation that was used for computing the correction for the sample selection problem. 20 There are several consistent findings. First, a larger stock market capitalization is associated with a lower probability of issuance. A possible interpretation is that public and private agents are in competition for international funds. The larger stock market is the harder for the government to place its bonds. 21 Second, if financial markets are liquid, as reflected by the turnover variable, it is easier for investors to hedge against risks and this makes it easier for the governments to place their debt in the market. However, this is a non linear relation, and for large levels of turnover the effect becomes negative. The non linear effect of stock market turnover on the issuance probability is represented in Chart 2. Finally, the larger the market capitalization of the public bond market, the easier that a government will issue debt. One should be cautious in giving an interpretation to this result. This may imply that larger bond markets make it easier to issue additional debt, but it can also reflect the fact that countries which issued large quantities of sovereign debt in the past are more likely to do it in the present. As can be seen in Chart 3, changes in the international liquidity index have a positive effect on the issuance probability. It should be noted, however, that the significance of the variables reflecting international liquidity was greatly reduced when the estimation included the measure about the size of the public bond market.
Issue Size Determinants
All the variables included in the analysis are based in previous analyses. 22 Most of those studies disregarded the role of financial conditions. An exception is Mody and Taylor (2004) .The results are summarized in table A3. There is strong evidence of a size effect, larger economies borrow larger amounts. The interest rate for the 10 years T-bill is negatively associated with the size of the issue. As before, when measures of international liquidity are 19. Note that the amount of observations falls greatly when data about public bond market is used. To maximize the number of observations available for the next step we decided not to include this variable when obtaining the Mills ratio. 20. The analysis was also performed by adding one variable at a time with identical results. 21. This is of course on of the many explanations that one can think of. Other would be that as the stock markets develop the Government faces less often the need of raising funds directly as firms can do it through the stock exchange. introduced the significance of this variable drops (see column 2). As one would expect, when the level of wealth in the hands of international investors rises, their appetite for developing sovereign bonds follows suit, and with it the size of the observed issues. This can be seen also in the significance of the dummy reflecting issues since 2000 period on which the interest of investors for developing countries' debt has grown together with the level of international liquidity (see chart 1). Dummies reflecting the currency denomination of the bond were introduced. Issues in U.S. dollars tend to be significantly larger, while issues denominated in domestic currency are smaller. This can be one of the factors explaining the recurrent use of hard currency issuance by developing countries. There is a group of explanatory variables whose effect changes when variables reflecting domestic financial conditions are introduced.
This can be seen when comparing the coefficients in columns 1 and 2 with those in columns 3 and 4. The ratio of short term debt to total debt, the ratio of debt service to exports, the sample selection control, and the political risk indicator, which in the absence of domestic financial variables had a negative and significant sign, turn positive or insignificant when the financial variables are added. The first two can be understood of variables determining financial needs, but can also represent liquidity problems. Once we control for financial conditions in a rigorous way, they are collecting the fact that more resources may be needed and hence the positive effect on the amount issued. The ratio of exports to GDP and the dummy reflecting previous debt rescheduling have a negative coefficient.
Domestic financial conditions have a significant effect on the amount of debt. As the turnover in the stock market increases, i.e., as the liquidity in domestic financial markets rises, the size of the issues becomes smaller. This result can be related to the positive effect of turnover on issuance. When financial markets are more liquid, governments can tap the market more often and do so in smaller amounts. Additionally, we found a non-linear effect from the relative size of the public bond market on the size of the issues. Increasing public bond markets seem to be associated with larger issues, however as the size keeps growing this effect becomes negative. When public bond markets become more developed issuance becomes easier, and as before this may give an incentive to governments to launch smaller issues at a time.
Determinants of the Maturity and Spread
As with the issuance decision, we performed the joint analysis of spreads and maturities in steps, adding to the benchmark specification [EHM (2001)] the variables reflecting financial conditions. Given that EHM (2001) analysis is closest to this, it seems the best way to proceed to stick to their specification as much as possible. Again, following EHM, a first step was to test for the existence of a non linear relation of maturities and spreads with the credit rating. 23 Given the results, as in previous studies, we performed the analysis by separating the observations in two categories, investment grade and non-investment grade bonds.
24
The results for the maturity are presented in table A4, and those for the spread in The variables were the ratio of turnover to net interest margin and the ratio of turnover to overhead costs. For both data sets, one factor was enough to collect most of the information available. 25 The results of the analysis are reported in Columns 5 and 6 from tables A4 and A5. The eigen values and factor loadings for both factors are presented
in Tables A7 and A8 in the appendix.
IDENTIFICATION
Comfortingly the variables proposed to identify the system were significant. This is always true for the variable representing the proportion of the population above 55. For many of the different specifications Sargan tests for overidentifying restrictions were performed. The results for the test were almost always positive, in the sense that the system was correctly identified. Therefore, the structural parameters obtained are to be trusted. Table A9 in the Appendix summarizes the results of the tests, and explains how they were performed.
Maturity
There is evidence of a negative relation between the spread and the maturity. This result is on While the pension system reform variables do not seem to affect the maturity, the results show a positive and highly significant relation between the proportion of population above 55 and the maturity of the issued bonds. The first result may be due to the fact that most of the bonds available for this part of the analysis were denominated in foreign currencies and issued in international markets, while pensions' reform tended to be financed with domestic debt.
25. The rule to select the number of factors was the standard one. Add those factors with an eigen value well above one.
Spread
Overall results point to a significant effect of domestic financial factors. More developed, in the sense of larger and/or more liquid domestic financial markets, drive down the observed spread, and this leads governments to issue larger maturities. This can be seen in columns 3 to 6 from Table A5 . The coefficients for the value and squared value of the size of the public bond market, the size of the stock market, and those for the factors obtained from both WDI and LLSV data have a highly significant and negative coefficient.
Also the international liquidity index has a consistent negative effect on the spreads.
Wealthier investors have an increased appetite for developing countries debt, and this is reflected in the premium they ask for, which is reduced. On the other hand, higher external debt, higher political risk, lower GDP growth, and a higher ratio of reserves to GDP, lead investors to ask for a higher yield, and thereby increase the observed spread. As in EHM a negative relation of both the 10 years U.S. T-bill and the mills ratio with the spreads was found. U.S. dollar denominated issues are not only associated with larger maturities, but also with larger spreads.
The results have an important message, they point to a synergy between domestic financial factors and the conditions under which developing economies can borrow in international markets. Better developed domestic markets help improving financing conditions abroad. In addition, through the effect that the spread has on the preferred maturity of the government, they lead to larger maturities.
Simultaneous Issuance: the case for being strategic
Throughout the paper we have tried to overcome a variety of sources of endogeneity by using both lags and exclusion restrictions. In this section we explore another possible miss-specification of the model, issuance clustering. Table 2 below presents the quarterly average maximum maturity observed for two groups. One containing those observations for which no other issue was observed that quarter (unique). The other contains the maximum maturity in periods when more than one bond was issued (clustered). It shows that "simultaneous" issuance is more common in domestic markets, while it is accompanied by a longer range of maturities in international markets. When developing economies cluster issuance in determined periods of time the same fundamentals need to explain a variety of maturities and spreads. It sounds reasonable that, by offering a more diverse spectrum of assets, investors are better able to diversify their portfolio, which could make their willingness to hold larger maturities increase and/or reduce the premium to be paid. Not accounting for this could lead to biased estimates. The importance of issuance clustering for the observed debt structure, and the concerns about estimation biases are analyzed below.
How far into the future? The case for strategic issuance As just argued the scope of this section is twofold. On the one hand, it will allow us to check if the results obtained in the previous section are robust. On the other hand, by assessing the effects of issuing a variety of bonds in specific periods on the terms of the same, we are investigating if there is a case for developing economies to strategically concentrate debt issuance in specific periods. We pursued the following strategy. For every period for every country we chose the bond with the largest maturity. In this way for each country at each point in time there is at most one bond. Additionally to control for the effect that offering a variety of bonds can have, an indicator (a variety dummy) was constructed which takes a value one when in that specific period a country issued more than one bond. As argued above, significance of this coefficient may be associated with effects arising from allowing investors to diversify their portfolio. The results for a variety of specifications are presented in table A6. Remarkably the results are basically identical to those obtained before. This indicates that previous estimates did not suffer from biases arising form simultaneous issuance. As before, more developed domestic financial markets reduce the spread to be paid, and this raises the observed maximum maturity. Additionally, we find a significant effect of the variety dummy on the maximum maturity observed. When countries offer the market a variety of bonds they are able to place bonds with larger maturities.
These are important results. First, they show that countries can benefit from timing the issuances and offering a variety of alternatives. Second, this reinforces the argument on the benefits of developing the domestic financial markets. Results show how they help to enlarge the maximum maturity for which bonds can be issued. Conclusion This paper adds to a large list of studies trying to understand what factors drive the borrowing strategy followed by developing economies. The paper presents an estimation strategy which allows identification of the structural parameters in a model of the simultaneous determination of maturities and spreads. The model was estimated using data on individual bond issuance by sovereign governments and was used to asses the impact of financial development on the terms of sovereign debt contracts. Results regarding the effect of the usual macroeconomic aggregate variables are in line with previous studies.
As one would expect, estimates point to a significant effect of both domestic and international conditions. This effect affects both the timing and the form of sovereign borrowing. When the level of liquidity international markets is high, Governments find it easier to tap the market, and can do so with better conditions. On the other hand, better functioning domestic financial markets, both for stocks and for bonds, seem to affect the conditions that investors impose on international bonded debt. Results suggest that well developed domestic bond markets and more liquid financial markets help reducing spreads, and this creates incentives for issuing bonds with longer maturities.
To address concerns about miss-specification, we analyzed the effect of issuance clustering. Reassuringly, this effect, though significant, does not seem to be driving the rest of the results. The results give a significant role to issuance clustering. When a variety of bonds is offered to investors, governments seem to be able to issue debt on larger maturities.
Developing economies should try to take advantage from this by strategically clustering their debt issuance. These results reinforce the argument in favor of developing domestic financial markets as a way to reduce the depth of financial crises. 
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Simple manipulation of the equations above leads to the two following equations:
(1 Increases in the availability of funds on international markets are followed by rising maturities along with decreasing spreads. Increases on the liquidity of domestic financial markets raise the maturity of the debt, and this raises the spread.
